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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 1: PHASE RANDOMISATION
To satisfy the security proofs of decoy-state MDI-QKD it is important that phase is randomised between weak
coherent states. Our setup intrinsically achieves this by the nature of gain-switching the primary laser: by periodically
driving the laser below threshold each clock cycle for a sufficient time for the laser cavity to empty of photons, each
pulse grows from spontaneous emission—i.e. is effectively seeded by random vacuum fluctuations.
This is confirmed by passing the unattenuated pulse train (where each pulse has 75 ps duration, as shown in
Supplementary Fig. 1a) from each transmitter through an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) with
one arm delayed to interfere consecutive coherent states. The output intensity is measured on a photodiode and
oscilloscope, then processed to form a histogram of the output intensities at the centre of 105 pulses. The histogram
(Supplementary Fig. 1b) exhibits the 1 + cos(φ) shape expected for interference of pulses with uniformly distributed
random relative phase φ, including accounting for experimental uncertainties [1].
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 2: FOUR-INTENSITY DECOY STATE PROTOCOL & KEY RATE
CALCULATION
We employ a 4-intensity decoy-state protocol [2] for MDI-QKD, described as follows. Alice and Bob prepare weak
coherent states with fluxes µi and µj , respectively, encoded with a random bit value {0, 1}. Pulses prepared in the
Z-basis are signal states with flux µ = s, which are used to generate secure key material, whereas states in the X-basis
can be µ ∈ {u, v, w}, corresponding to 3 possible decoy states that are used for parameter estimation to bound the
single-photon yield and error rate. States are prepared randomly with selection probability P ∈ {P sZ , PuX , P vX , PwX},
where the probability of encoding in the Z-basis is PZ = P
s






X , such that



























Supplementary Figure 1. Characterisation of transmitter output: (a) pulse shape measured on oscilloscope; (b) histogram
of pulse amplitudes after AMZI (blue bars) and simulated AMZI output accounting for experimental imperfections (black line)
showing that pulse phase is randomised.
To generate a secure key, Alice and Bob send their prepared states along the quantum communication channel to
Charlie, who performs a Bell state measurement and announces which states resulted in a successful projection onto
the singlet Bell state. Alice and Bob then engage in classical communication to share basis information and perform
sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification. In practical communication, the finite sample
size of states measured prior to processing means that all measurements are subject to statistical fluctuations, which
thus need to be incorporated in the security analysis.
A proof-of-principle measurement is performed to highlight the secure key rate that is achievable from our gigahertz-





Θ , respectively, for basis Θ ∈ {X,Z} and flux µ ∈ {s, u, v, w}. These measurements are then
used to estimate lower-bounded single-photon yield y1,1
Θ
and upper-bounded error rate e1,1Θ , from which a lower bound


















, h(·) is the binary entropy function, fEC = 1.16 accounts for error-correction inefficiency
and ∆ is a reduction due to finite size effects (discussed later).
We now summarise the relevant equations and our numerical approach for computing the single-photon yield and
error bounds, in order to evaluate Eqn. 1. Full proofs can be found in Refs. [2–4] and a detailed derivation of the
security analysis in Ref. [5].
A. Asymptotic Analysis
We begin with an asymptotic analysis that neglects finite-size effects, enabling our results to be compared to other
works where statistical fluctuations are not considered. The first step is to find the single-photon yield and error rate
in the X-basis, y1,1
X
and e1,1X . While analytical equations have been derived to estimate these quantities [6], a more
accurate value that takes all experimental constraints into account can be found by following a numerical approach.
The gain of each weak coherent state combination is related to a summation over all possible photon number states
that are emitted by Alice and Bob, accounting for Poisson photon statistics. By truncating this infinite summation,
inequalities are formed which act as constraints for the numerical optimisation of y1,1
X
, in addition to the logical
requirement that 0 ≤ y1,1X ≤ 1. Therefore, y1,1X can be estimated by the linear program:
minimise y1,1X (2)





































































and the program is solved for all n,m ≤ Scut (Scut = 15 is an arbitrary integer that defines the maximum summation
term) and µi, µj ∈ {u, v, w}. In practice, we solve the linear programming problems using the revised simplex method.
Following similar arguments, an additional linear program can be derived to estimate e1,1X :
maximise b1,1X (4)







































X . The single-photon error rate is extracted









and ∆ = 0,
enabling these numerically optimised terms to be inserted into Eqn. 1 to estimate the secure key rate.
B. Finite-Size Analysis
We now advance our analysis to account for statistical fluctuations in the data sample, starting with a widely used
assumption that the fluctuations follow a Gaussian distribution [3]. A fluctuation function is defined: F (ζ, n) = n/
√
ζ
where n is the number of standard deviations which are summed over to quantify the statistical error in each measured
value [3] (here, we use n = 7 to limit the failure probability to< 10−10 [5]). Using this function, the linear programming
problems to find y1,1
X
and e1,1X in the finite-size regime can be written as:
minimise y1,1X (5)


























































































X is the number of states sent in the finite sample in the X-basis with fluxes µi and µj . Finally, the









and is fixed as 1.5 × 10−6 [5]. These single-photon quantities can then be inserted into
Eqn. 1 to obtain the secure key rate.
4
C. Finite-Size Analysis with Composable Security
Finally, we discuss a more advanced finite-size analysis that relaxes assumption about the distribution of noise
fluctuations and guarantees composable security against even coherent eavesdropper attacks [4, 5]. This is based on
applying the multiplicative Chernoff bound to quantities in the measurement sample.
We start by bounding the number of states transmitted by the users N
µi,µj
Θ , for each basis (Θ) and photon
flux (µi, µj) combination. These quantities are disclosed during classical communication after the whole sample
is measured, but due to the users’ independent choices of basis and intensity, they are fluctuating quantities that must
be bounded in the finite-size regime. By defining the function g(x, y) =
√





Θ ) is guaranteed to be greater (smaller) than N
µi,µj



















where ε0 = 4× 10−13 is used to limit the total failure probability to < 10−10.
We can then follow a similar procedure to bound the number of successful Bell state measurement counts, C
µiµj
Θ ,
and number of erroneous Bell state counts, EC
µiµj




Θ were directly measured in our
experiment, however, they have been processed for displaying in Tables II & III as the gain and QBER by normalising












Θ ). By replacing N






































which are used to reformulate the linear programming problem:
minimise y1,1X (13)












































































discussed previously. Finally, to compute the key rate using Eqn. 1, we follow the approach in Ref. [5], defining the










NZ − g(s2e−2sy1,1Z NZ , ε0)|, 0
}
, (15)
where Ntot is the total number of states transmitted in the sample.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 3: PARAMETER OPTIMISATION
For optimum QKD system performance, it is important to carefully select all operating parameters in order to
maximise the secure key rate. While general best-practice trends are known, for example, biasing basis selection to
prepare the majority of states in the Z (key-generating) basis, the exact optimal parameters vary for each experimental
implementation and also depend on the channel loss. Therefore, a full optimisation procedure is necessary to obtain
the best possible results.
In the four-state decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol, we are required to optimise the intensities of s, u, v and w, in
addition to the probabilities of the users choosing to prepare and transmit each state. The probabilities of state
preparation are the same for each user and the requirement for unity sum of probabilities removes one degree of
freedom. Additionally, to simplify the problem, we also fix the vacuum intensity to w = 2 × 10−4. This still leaves
six parameters to optimise in our system, which is non-trivial and beyond the scope of a simple exhaustive parameter
space search approach.
We therefore perform a full numerical optimisation by noting that the problem is convex and using a local optimisa-
tion algorithm, bounded to experimentally practical intensities and probabilities in the range (0, 1). The algorithm is
provided with a fitness function to maximise, comprising the secure key rate calculation in the finite-size regime with
composable security where the gain and QBER are determined by simulating the protocol using the six optimisation
variables in addition to experimentally measured component values. Supplementary Fig. 2 shows the optimised pa-
rameters, which were then used in our experiments (see main text), resulting in strong agreement between theoretically
modelled and measured key rates.



























































Supplementary Figure 2. Numerically optimised parameters for our MDI-QKD system (including finite size effects, with
composable security) with respect to total channel losses: (a) state intensities (w was fixed as 2×10−4); (b) probability of
encoding bit in Z basis (signal state s); (c) probability of encoding a u, v or w decoy state in the X basis (note that probabilities
are plotted relative to the probably of encoding in the X basis).
6
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Supplementary Tables I–III report detailed experimental results for our proof-of-principle MDI-QKD system at
various channel loss values. Supplementary Table I presents the computed secure key rates using the three security
analyses considered in this work, based on processing the raw experimental measurements obtained in the Z-basis
(Table II) and X-basis (Table III). Supplementary Fig. 3 plots a selection of this data to show the measured gain
and QBER for the cases where both parties send a bit either in the Z basis (s state) or the v state in the X basis
(discussed in main text).
Channel Loss




30 dB (188 km) 2228 1971 1118
32 dB (200 km) 1607 1227 564
34 dB (213 km) 975 681 130
40 dB (250 km) 209 58 –
42 dB (263 km) 114 7 –
50 dB (313 km) 24 – –
54 dB (338 km) 8 – –
Supplementary Table I. Experimental secure key rates R, with respect to total channel attenuation (dB). In parentheses,
we also report the equivalent distance in km, calculated by assuming ultra-low loss 0.16 dB km−1 fibre.
Z-Basis
Channel Loss Gain, Qs,sZ QBER, E
s,s
Z Flux, s Prob., P
s
Z
30 dB (188 km) 1.18×10−05 1.07% 0.55 85.0%
32 dB (200 km) 8.75×10−06 0.92% 0.60 83.0%
34 dB (213 km) 6.48×10−06 0.84% 0.63 81.0%
40 dB (250 km) 1.85×10−06 0.70% 0.63 81.0%
42 dB (263 km) 1.08×10−06 0.63% 0.63 81.0%
50 dB (313 km) 1.70×10−07 0.55% 0.63 81.0%
54 dB (338 km) 7.07×10−08 0.55% 0.63 81.0%
Supplementary Table II. Experimental gains and errors in the Z-basis. These values were computed from the number of Bell
state measurements, where the total prepared state sample size was Ntot = 8.64 × 1013 and the number of state preparations
by the users is given by Ns,sZ = PZPZNtot. The QBER is observed to decrease slightly with increasing channel attenuation,








X Flux, µ Prob., PµX
u v w u v w
30 dB (188 km)
u 6.41×10−06 2.44×10−06 1.70×10−06 u 26.9% 36.5% 48.5% 0.24 1.0%
v 2.51×10−06 2.94×10−07 7.77×10−08 v 36.5% 26.6% 48.2% 0.047 9.3%
w 1.79×10−06 7.59×10−08 7.32×10−12 w 48.5% 47.9% 32.5% 0.0002 4.7%
32 dB (200 km)
u 4.32×10−06 1.67×10−06 1.14×10−06 u 26.6% 35.4% 48.5% 0.25 1.2%
v 1.78×10−06 2.38×10−07 6.42×10−08 v 35.4% 26.6% 48.2% 0.053 10.3%
w 1.19×10−06 5.80×10−08 4.82×10−12 w 48.5% 48.0% 43.0% 0.0002 5.5%
34 dB (213 km)
u 2.53×10−06 9.95×10−07 6.66×10−07 u 26.5% 35.0% 48.5% 0.24 1.3%
v 1.05×10−06 1.63×10−07 4.56×10−08 v 34.5% 26.6% 48.6% 0.056 11.4%
w 7.02×10−07 3.87×10−08 3.75×10−12 w 48.4% 48.5% 44.6% 0.0002 6.3%
40 dB (250 km)
u 7.29×10−07 2.73×10−07 1.78×10−07 u 26.8% 35.0% 48.6% 0.24 1.3%
v 2.97×10−07 4.30×10−08 1.10×10−08 v 35.2% 26.8% 48.1% 0.056 11.4%
w 1.95×10−07 1.06×10−08 1.07×10−12 w 48.5% 48.5% 22.6% 0.0002 6.3%
42 dB (263 km)
u 4.47×10−07 1.68×10−07 1.10×10−07 u 26.9% 35.0% 48.6% 0.24 1.3%
v 1.85×10−07 2.62×10−08 6.73×10−09 v 35.4% 27.1% 48.1% 0.056 11.4%
w 1.18×10−07 6.46×10−09 6.89×10−13 w 48.7% 47.7% 42.9% 0.0002 6.3%
50 dB (313 km)
u 7.13×10−08 2.61×10−08 1.69×10−08 u 27.1% 35.2% 49.2% 0.24 1.3%
v 2.93×10−08 4.15×10−09 9.27×10−10 v 34.8% 26.7% 48.5% 0.056 11.4%
w 1.91×10−08 1.04×10−09 3.91×10−14 w 48.8% 49.3% 49.5% 0.0002 6.3%
54 dB (338 km)
u 2.91×10−08 1.06×10−08 6.82×10−09 u 26.9% 33.8% 48.2% 0.24 1.3%
v 1.18×10−08 1.69×10−09 4.04×10−10 v 35.4% 26.7% 49.1% 0.056 11.4%
w 7.89×10−09 4.33×10−10 3.91×10−14 w 49.0% 46.0% 49.5% 0.0002 6.3%
Supplementary Table III. Experimental gains and errors in the X-basis. These values were computed from the number of
Bell state measurements for each state combination, where the total prepared state sample size was Ntot = 8.64× 1013 and the
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Supplementary Figure 3. Gain and QBER for the X-basis (decoy state v) and Z-basis (signal state s), as a function of total
channel loss (equivalent fibre distance assuming ultra-low loss 0.16 dB km−1 fibre is also shown). Experimental data (circles)
are in good agreement with numerical simulations (lines) based on our experimental parameters.
